War or Peace? The Future of Taiwan and the Role for the U.S.

The most consequential geopolitical question of our time

“War is a mere continuation of politics by other means.”

— Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831)

If World War III were to break out, it would be between the U.S. and China. If the U.S. and China were to go to war, it would be over Taiwan. Taiwan has been the most contentious issue in China-U.S. relations since diplomatic ties were established in 1979. It is the most serious security flash point in the world.

What should the world know about this potential catastrophe? How should the U.S. leverage its might to maintain peace across the Taiwan Strait?

(This article uses the shorthands “China” to refer to the People’s Republic of China which controls mainland China, and “Taiwan” to refer to the Republic of China which controls the island of Taiwan. This author takes no position on whether Taiwan is or should be an independent country.)

Historical Background

Like many geopolitical disputes in East Asia, the Taiwan question is deeply rooted in history.

Originally inhabited by Austronesian populations, Taiwan was annexed by the Qing dynasty in 1683 and became predominantly Chinese due to migration from the mainland in the 18^th century. It was ceded to Japan after the Qing lost the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Once Japan surrendered in 1945, Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China. However, the Nationalist-led Republic soon lost the mainland to the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 in a bloody civil war.

From this point onward, the Republic of China only controlled the island of Taiwan and several minor islands, leading to a gradual loss of diplomatic recognition. It ultimately lost its UN membership in 1971, when the General Assembly voted to recognize the People’s Republic of China as “the only legitimate representative of China”. Even its long-time ally America withdrew recognition and terminated the mutual defense treaty in 1978. Today, only 11 UN member states recognize the Republic of China.

Taiwan transitioned to a multiparty democracy in the 1990s, when the Nationalists ended the civil war emergency and relinquished its monopoly on power. The Democratic Progressive Party emerged as the main alternative, rooted in Taiwanese nativism. Nonetheless, the Republic of China, commonly referred to as simply Taiwan, has always claimed all of China as its constitutional territory. Meanwhile, Mandarin is the lingua franca of both Taiwan and China.

Deep economic ties developed between Taiwan and China, especially in technology. TSMC, Foxconn, and MediaTek, Taiwan’s three largest technology firms, are intimately linked to China. In 2010, 80% of Taiwan’s foreign direct investment was made in China. In 2020, 44% of Taiwan’s exports went to China. Recent economic diversification notwithstanding, Taiwanese visited mainland China four million times in 2024.

America’s Position and Thinking on Taiwan

Since the U.S. switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, it has upheld the one-China policy, a core demand of the CCP. This policy is based on the Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-China joint communiques, and the Six Assurances. Although the U.S. has neither military presence in Taiwan nor treaty obligation to defend the island, it is Taiwan’s only major military backer, bolstering it with weapons and advice.

The one-China policy of the US differs from China’s one-China principle — China claims Taiwan as part of the People’s Republic of China, which the U.S. does not recognize. The U.S. formally treats Taiwan’s political status as undetermined. It opposes both a Communist invasion of Taiwan and formal Taiwanese independence; yet the former commands much more attention and effort in the U.S. than the latter.

Making the world safe for democracies, first articulated by Woodrow Wilson, remains one of the fundamental motivations for American foreign policy, shared by both the elite and the public. From a realist lens, Taiwan’s dominance in advanced semiconductor fabrication puts it at the center of American technology supply chains. At present, almost all of Nvidia’s and Apple’s highest-end chips, Blackwells for LLM training and Apple Silicon for iPhones, are made in Taiwan.

China’s Position and Thinking on Taiwan

Since the death of Mao in 1976, the Communist Party has preferred peaceful reunification while strongly rejecting Taiwan independence. The proposed solution has been “one country, two systems”, where China promises autonomy in exchange for Taiwan’s acceptance that it’s part of the People’s Republic of China. China has gone so far as to offer Taiwan a continued independent military as a special region of the country. The threat of force is designed to deter independence and American military presence.

In the post-Mao era, the ideology of the CCP has been shifting away from Marxism-Maoism toward nationalism. Eschewing Mao’s emphasis on eradicating free markets and fomenting worldwide revolution, the party-state formally adopted the mantra the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” in 2002. It’s the core message propagated to the people by party media daily, occasionally framed as the “Sinicization of Marxism”. The CCP justifies its legitimacy by presenting itself as the guardian of the Chinese civilization. Central to the legitimacy claim is the eventual reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Under Xi Jinping, the shift has only accelerated.

As a result, China tries to extinguish hints of international legitimacy for Taiwan, such as formal membership in international organizations or official visits involving world leaders. In the World Trade Organization and the Olympics, Taiwan participates as “Chinese Taipei”. When Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022, China launched the largest military exercise around Taiwan in history, as protest and deterrence.

Rising Taiwanese Nationalism and Taiwanese Politics

Despite its ethnic Chinese nature and strong economic relations, the Taiwanese people have moved away from identifying as Chinese and toward favoring independence. According to two long-running surveys by the National Chengchi University in Taiwan, the percentage who identify as Chinese collapsed from 71.9% in 1992 to 32.8% in 2025, and support for independence rose from 11.1% in 1994 to 25.8% in 2025. Only 6.4% favor reunification, down from 20% in 1994, while more than 87.9% wish to keep the status quo for now, near all-time high.

Responding to voter sentiments, both major parties in Taiwan — the pro-reunification Chinese Nationalist Party and the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party — have chosen to largely maintain the status quo. On the one hand, Taiwanese public opinion makes peaceful reunification highly unlikely. On the other hand, the invasion threat appears to have solidified the public support for the status quo for the time being.

Major differences between the two parties persist.

The Democratic Progressive Party insists Taiwan and China are separate countries. The DPP’s pledge to a Republic of Taiwan in its party platform remains a thorn in the CCP’s flesh. The refusal of DPP presidents to negotiate reunification or deeper trade ties with China has led to a freeze in dialogue and sanctions from China. Lai Ching-te, the new president of Taiwan from the DPP, is a self-avowed champion of Taiwan independence. Despite recent pledges to keep the status quo, Lai called for a new constitution for Taiwan in 2019, shortly after his tenure as prime minister. The first DPP president, Chen Shui-bian, advocated for a Republic of Taiwan while in office in 2007, breaking his key promise.

The Chinese Nationalist Party has a different philosophy. It views mainland China and Taiwan as one country. Even though it has never accepted “one country, two systems”, it gravitates toward dialogue and economic integration with China. When President Ma Ying-jeou from the CNP was in power from 2008 to 2016, the relationship was stable and a major trade agreement was ratified, despite no political concessions of substance. As a sign of détente, China allowed Taiwan observer status in the WHO from 2009 through 2016 as “Chinese Taipei”.

Taiwan’s Direct Democracy and Constitutional Framework

Under Taiwan’s referendum law first adopted by the legislature in 2003, 1.5% of the electorate is sufficient to initiate a plebiscite, which passes if yes votes represent more than 25% of eligible voters. The legislature, controlled by the DPP, lowered the threshold for passage in 2017 and may continue to do so. For a constitutional amendment, consent from 75% of the legislature and more than 50% of eligible voters is required. Formal independence entails a constitutional amendment to amend the official name, territory, and anthem of the country. In this case, the legislature may not lower the threshold unilaterally, which requires a constitutional amendment in the first place.

A non-constitutional referendum has become the critical conduit for populist proposals for Taiwanese independence. In 2008, independence activists, with the endorsement of President Chen from the DPP, initiated a referendum on applying for UN membership as “Taiwan”. In 2020, they initiated a similar referendum to apply to participate in the Olympics as “Taiwan”. With China holding a veto in the Security Council and wielding significant influence on the International Olympic Committee, neither proposal was ever realistic. In the end, both referendums failed to pass but signaled the brinksmanship of the independence movement. Either would have unnecessarily provoked China and invited economic if not military retaliation. In practice, Taiwan already enjoys independence, free to enter into bilateral agreements and issue passports. But for Taiwanese ultranationalists, it’s not enough.

When it comes to reunifying Taiwan, China cares much more about appearance than substance. International recognition of “Taiwan” is the battleground. A constitutional amendment changing the official name from the Republic of China to the Republic of Taiwan is the public redline for the CCP.

Shifting Balance of Power

An uneasy peace has survived for decades mostly because of mutual deterrence between China and the U.S. It is being rapidly eroded by the rise of China.

Unlike Israel, Taiwan doesn’t have nuclear weapons. Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan doesn’t have strategic depth and can’t be easily supplied in war. Only U.S. military intervention can save Taiwan in the event of an invasion.

The gap between the Chinese and U.S. militaries has been narrowing since China’s economy took off four decades ago. After adjusting for purchasing power, China’s military spending reaches 541 billion dollars, 59% of the U.S. figure. The U.S. armed forces cover the globe, while the People’s Liberation Army’s top priority is Taiwan. When the PLA first took over mainland China, it had no navy to speak of. Seven decades of buildup later, China has a larger navy than America. Furthermore, according to disclosed U.S. intelligence, the CCP plans to have the capability to defeat the U.S. in a war over Taiwan for the first time by 2027.

Taiwan’s Lukewarm Commitment to Defense

Official rhetoric aside, Taiwan has shown limited willingness to defend itself. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Taiwan’s military spending never exceeded 2% of GDP from 2010 to 2022. It reached 2.2% in 2023 and fell to 2.1% in 2024. In addition, it slowly cut mandatory military service for men from two years from before 2000 to four months. Only in 2022 did it reverse course, only raising it back to one year. In contrast, South Korea, with U.S. troops protecting its borders, imposes 18 months of service or more on male citizens. In energy security, Taiwan shut down its last nuclear power plant in 2025, becoming almost entirely dependent on imported fossil fuels, which could be easily cut off by China.

The policies reflect Taiwan’s lack of will to fight. Indeed U.S. intervention couldn’t protect Taiwan if it’s unwilling to defend itself. Such unseriousness from Taiwan signals weakened deterrence to China.

Dubious Political Will in the U.S.

In recent decades, major U.S. military casualties abroad have triggered intense domestic backlash. After the Battle of Mogadishu killed 18 U.S. servicemen, the U.S. withdrew from Somalia. The deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan have contributed to the ascent of national conservatism in the Republican Party, which is inward-looking and highly skeptical of foreign entanglement risking U.S. lives. Credible polling data bears this out — 36% of Americans would support an intervention to stop China, down from 40% in 2022. Crucially, it may well be an overestimate. A 2023 CSIS war game projects 3,200 U.S. troops will die defending Taiwan within one month should the U.S. intervene. The U.S. has not had such sudden massive casualties since the Korean War.

Unless China is foolish enough to strike Guam or American forces in Japan first, it’s doubtful a U.S. president will come to Taiwan’s rescue and suffer the political cost. With TSMC starting to manufacture cutting-edge chips in the U.S., the benefit for the U.S. is shrinking, the cost ballooning. This changing political reality likewise signals weakened deterrence to China.

America at a Crossroads

The U.S. now faces a historic choice. To continue to safeguard peace in the Taiwan Strait, it may pursue either dual deterrence, or total abandonment. Both options are superior to the current approach and secure peace for the long run.

Option A: dual deterrence

U.S. military bases in Japan are essential for a successful intervention. The U.S.–Japan Security Treaty allows U.S. forces to use their bases “for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East”. Nonetheless, the U.S. has promised in diplomatic notes to “consult” Japan before using them to defend other countries. America may urge Japan to pass a law to give the U.S. explicit prior approval to use military bases in Japan to protect Taiwan and other key areas in East Asia. The U.S. president may publicly support amending Japan’s U.S.-imposed constitution to have a full-fledged military, despite certain objections from China and South Korea. A stronger and more engaged Japan would strengthen deterrence.

Further, the U.S. needs to put deterring independence on an equal footing as deterring invasion.

The American president may make it explicit that formal independence would mean no U.S. intervention and urge the Democratic Progressive Party to amend its platform to remove the goal of a Republic of Taiwan. Threat of arms cutoff may be used. This may be paired with concessions from China, such as decreased military activities around Taiwan, ceasing attempts to pry away Taiwan’s diplomatic relations, and support for Taiwan’s international participation as “Chinese Taipei” or “Chinese Taiwan”. Concerns about interfering in Taiwanese politics should be superseded by the Israeli precedents. It would deter a pro-independence Taiwanese president from endorsing another referendum on formal independence or declaring a new country unilaterally. The U.S. president could also announce a policy to oppose Taiwan’s efforts to join international organizations under the sole name “Taiwan”. The U.S. may arrange a peace treaty negotiation to formally end the Chinese Civil War between the PLA and the ROC Armed Forces, without touching on reunification or independence. It’s long desired by the CCP and would stabilize the relationship.

Option B: complete abandonment

An announcement from the U.S. president to abandon Taiwan militarily would crush the morale of the Taiwan independence movement. It could be coupled with deep concessions from China in major areas, including the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, cyber espionage, North Korea, and trade. At worst, it would pave the way for a peaceful takeover of Taiwan by China. Conversely, a treaty ratified by the Senate to defend Taiwan would plausibly spark an immediate invasion by forcing the CCP to defend its credibility and legitimacy. Such a grand bargain continues to be less politically feasible than Option A, given public and Congressional support for Taiwan.

Coda

76 years after the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan is a prosperous democracy with an increasingly independent identity. An intricate peace has been sustained for generations, based on ambiguous sovereignty and interlocking deterrence. Currently, it is being threatened from all sides. With enough wisdom and courage, we can preserve the status quo and avert a future conflict.